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During the 1900s, methods of procuring military manpower in the United States
have fluctuated among all-volunteer, conscription, or some combination of the two. In
addition, several systems of conscription have been employed—ranging from the pre-
lottery system which offered a wide assortment of deferments, to the lottery system,
which essentially decreased the number of deferments. The arguments most commonly
used to support the use of conscription are that (1) it allows the government to
mobilize a relatively large military manpower force in a short period of time and, (2) it
permits the government to establish a military wage which is lower than that
established by an all-volunteer force, thereby lowering budget expenditures.
The use of conscription to procure military manpower involves many social and
economic issues. This study addresses the economic issue of what the true cost of
conscription is to society. The purpose here is to evaluate the economic cost of
peacetime conscription and to quantify the social welfare loss or "deadweight" loss to
the U. S. public from a hypothetical draft in the 1980s. This will be done using a
mathematical model of the military labor market.
Except for several periods during the 1900s (1946-1947, 1948-1950, and
1954-1964), the general trend in the U. S. has been to use conscription during periods
of conflict and to switch to a scaled down all-volunteer force following the conflict.
[Ref. 1: p. 1 1 1- 1-29] This most recently occurred in 1973 when the draft was terminated
and all-volunteer recruitment was substituted. Recognizing the potential need for
conscription during wartime, the focus of this study will be on which procurement
policy is appropriate during peacetime.
The draft bypasses standard market allocating mechanisms and interrupts the
normal supply and demand forces present in the labor market. As a result,
inefficiencies and a misallocation of society's resources occur. These inefficiencies take
the form of a "conscription tax" and the costs of collecting that tax, a redistribution of
income, restrictions on labor mobility, and excessive personnel turnover rates. Sjaastad
and Hansen describe conscription in the following way: [Ref. 2: p. IV- 1-1]
Bv use of coercion the government acquires the personal ser-
vices of large numbers of individuals under terms very favor-
able to the general taxpaver but rather unfavorable to the in-
dividuals rendering those' services.
Draftees and draft-motivated volunteers are subjected to a conscription tax which
is discriminatory in the sense that only some are required to serve. Since not everyone
is required to serve, draft eligible people have incentives to undertake activities to avoid
being inducted. Although these activities have value to the individual, they are socially
useless. The costs incurred to avoid being drafted represent a part of what is referred
to in public finance terms as the costs of collecting the conscription tax. They
represent one component of social welfare losses. A more detailed discussion and the
development of a model to predict these costs follows in the next chapter.
Social welfare losses also occur as a result of who is selected to serve. If a
conscription policy selects individuals according to what their alternative wage (supply
price) is in the private sector (i.e. the lowest supply priced individuals are selected first),
then the effect will be to decrease social welfare losses. If, however, a conscription
policy randomly selects individuals without regard to their supply price, then some
higher supply priced individuals will be inducted. The productive output foregone by
these individuals is higher and this has the effect of increasing social welfare losses. A
model for predicting these costs is also developed in the next chapter.
Factors related to demand also have an effect on social welfare losses. Assuming
that the military can pay a lower wage under the draft, it will be encouraged to use
more labor resources than are socially optimal. This overutilization of manpower will
produce a social welfare loss. This study assumes that the size of the military labor
force is predetermined by other factors and is a given constraint. Thus, the military,
under this assumption, will not take advantage of lower wages and overutilize military
labor.
B. BUDGET COSTS VERSUS ECONOMIC COSTS
Two categories of cost to be considered in evaluating manpower procurement
policies are budget costs and economic costs. Budget costs are the highly visible and
relatively easily measured costs that taxpayers bear to support a military labor force.
Economic cost is the opportunity cost to society. It reflects the foregone productive
capacity of labor resources employed by the military. It is a less visible cost which
I represents the value of this labor as it could be used in other activities.
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Budget costs, in this case, are more of a measure of government policy toward
conscripts than a measure of value. In a competitive market, budget costs and
economic costs will be equal on the margin. When there is intervention in the form of
a draft, labor market supply and demand forces are interrupted and these two measures
of cost can diverge.
The traditional belief is that, holding a number of other factors constant, the use
of conscription allows the government to pay a lower military wage, thereby lowering
budget costs.
C. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Sjaastad and Hansen [Ref. 2] developed one of the first widely used models to
predict social welfare losses under conscription. These losses are related specifically to
draft avoidance and to enforcement. Their study develops the concept of a
discriminator}' conscription tax--a tax which is borne by draftees and draft-motivated
volunteers under a system of conscription. The costs of collecting this tax --which
include the resources expended to avoid the draft-are socially useless and represent
deadwight losses. Although it is extremely difficult to quantify the economic costs of a
draft, they incorporate the supply and demand forces of the military labor market into
their model and use this model to predict the behavior of those affected.
Sjaastad and Hansen estimate the costs of collection of a 2.5 million man force,
in 1969 dollars, to range from SI. 75 billion to S3. 63 billion. They recognize that the
magnitude of social welfare losses will depend on the specific type of conscription used.
The principal conclusions reached in their study are that conscription under
Selective Service is a very inefficient taxation device and that the tax itself is
substantial. Their results showed that under varying circumstances, the costs of
collection exceed the tax itself by 50 to 100 percent.
Oi [Ref. 3] also addresses the concept of an implicit conscription tax. He
recognizes that not only does conscription impose a tax on draftees and draft-
motivated volunteers- it also imposes an additional tax on true volunteers. In the
absence of the draft, persons who are true volunteers at current wages would receive an
economic rent because the military wage would have to be increased to attract the
required number of recruits. The use of coercion under conscription reduces rent
received by true volunteers. Oi also recognizes that the draft is not efficient in the
sense that it selects individuals with the lowest supply price. Finally, he acknowledges
11
the costs incurred by individuals attempting to avoid the draft but makes no attempt to
measure these costs.
Hansen and Weisbrod [Ref. 4] evaluate the economic impact of the draft in terms
of "distributive" and "allocative" effects. Distributive effects are measured by how the
burden (e.g. conscription tax) of maintaining a military is distributed to various
members of society. Allocative effects refers to the efficiency with which labor
resources are allocated under a draft.
Hansen and Weisbrod develop a model which is used to predict the additional
costs resulting from increased turnover, and increased uncertainty in the private sector
under conscription, holding the number of effective labor units constant. Using the
1963 population of 650.000 draftees and "draft-affected" enlistees and assuming a
random selection process within each education group, they estimate the distributive
effects to be S960 to S990 million and the allocative costs (social welfare loss) to be
S870 to 1,180 million.
Cooper. [Ref. 5] using an extension of the model developed by Sjaastad and
Hansen, addresses issues dealing with the budget costs and economic costs of various
procurement policies. He. like many others, believes that conscription allows the
general public to pay less, in actual budget expenditures, for military manpower. He
suggests that the draft affords society the opportunity to bypass the standard labor
market allocating mechanism and, in so doing, creates inefficiencies. These
inefficiencies, some of which are significant, take on many forms and must be
considered when selecting a procurement policy.
Cooper argues that not only supply, but also demand related factors have an
effect on social welfare losses. The military will tend to overutilize labor resources
under conscription because of lower wages. Labor that has higher-valued alternative
uses in the private sector ends up being used for military purposes under the draft. He
estimates that under certain assumptions, the military could demand as many as 55
percent more first term personnel than are socially optimal.
By using the model developed by Sjaastad and Hansen, Cooper is able to
calculate the social welfare losses for the pre-Vietnam year of 1964 that result from
three factors. He estimates the first component of welfare losses
,
draft avoidance
costs, to range from S0.7 billion to S3. 7 billion depending on the type of conscription
used (pre-lottery or lottery) and depending on the assumption about the slope
(increasing, constant, decreasing) of the supply curve. The social welfare loss due to the
overemployment of labor, the second factor, was estimated to be S700 million for 1964.
12
Cooper expands on the model to consider the social welfare losses that result
when a degree of randomness is introduced into the draft selection process. These
additional costs are based on who actually serves and are calculated to range from
SS50 million to SI, 350 million. Although he does not calculate a specific value, Cooper
mentions one additional factor, labor turnover, as a cause of welfare losses. He
suggests that because conscripted forces generally have shorter tours of duty than all-
volunteer forces, they tend to require more personnel to realize a given amount of
labor input. This increases not only economic costs but also budget costs which
results in a social welfare loss.
Cooper concludes his study with an evaluation of how the costs of military
manpower procurement policies vary as the proportion of the eligible population that
is required to serve varies. He states that [Ref. 5: p. 91]
The undesirable economic consequences of conscription, vis-a-vis other
procurment policies, are largely mitigated when a large fraction of the manpower
pool must serve.
When evaluating alternative policies, a comparison must be made of the economic rent
provided under an all-volunteer poicy and the excess economic costs incurred under
conscription.
Borcherding [Ref. 6] was the first to recognize that social welfare losses may be
present with a volunteer military as well. These losses are a result of the
underemployment of labor in the military, given the upward-sloping nature of the
military labor supply curve. He suggests that it is very difficult to determine before the
fact which welfare loss is greater— that associated with the overemployment of labor
under the draft or the underemployment of labor with an all-volunteer military. As the
size of the military labor force varies, Borcherding's arguments become increasingly
relevant.
Recognizing Borcherding's contribution, Cooper [Ref. 7] develops a simple model
of military supply and demand to calculate the social welfare losses that result because
of the over- or underutilization of labor resources by the military. The low wages of a
draft encourage the military to use more labor resources than that which is socially
optimal. In an all-volunteer environment, the military will tend to underutilize labor
resources because of high wages. Cooper confines his study to this one area of social
welfare loss. He compares the losses present both with and without a draft. The losses
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associated the draft are shown to be several times larger than those associated with a
volunteer military-- S2.4 billion per year for the draft in 1973 dollars versus S1.5 billion
per year for a volunteer force. Cooper argues that the model he uses will tend to
underestimate the social welfare loss under the draft and will overestimate the loss with
a volunteer military. The model underestimates the losses under a draft because it fails
to capture fully the social costs of the draft since most systems of conscription select
individuals without regard for supply price. For example, if an individual with a high
supply price is selected for induction, the social welfare loss will be greater than the
loss associated with the induction of a low supply-priced individual. This is true
because the difference between the civilian wage and the military wage for a high
supply-priced individual is greater than the difference for a low supply-priced
individual. Additionally, his model does not account for draft avoidance expenditures
and reduced employment opportunities. It tends to overestimate social welfare losses
of a volunteer military because it fails to recognize the military services as
discriminating or constrained monopsonists. For example, the military discriminates
according to supply price by paying enlistment bonuses to high school graduates who
score above average on mental aptitude examinations. These individuals would, most
likely, have higher reservation wages. To the extent that the military acts as a
discriminating or constrained monopsonist, the model overestimates welfare losses.
Additionally, his model does not account for draft avoidance expenditures and reduced
employment opportunities.
An All-Volunteer (AVF) Task Force, [Ref. 8] under the chairmanship of
Secretary of Defense Weinberger, concluded in 1982 that the AVF is working and can
continue to meet its recruiting goals through Fiscal Year 1987. However, it states that
an increase in military compensation relative to civilian wages is necessary to achieve
this goal. Options for a draft or national service analyzed include a minimal active
force draft, draft with discouragement of volunteers, draft to improve accession
qualifications, draft without volunteers, draft for Reserves, universal military training,
universal national service, national service linked to prospective draft, broad-based
national service draft, and benefit-conditional national service. Of the above, the last
four would have a budget cost in excess of S40 billion, while the additional budget cost
of the others would be less than S1.5 billion. The Task Force concluded that if
conscription is selected as the method to procure military manpower, the minimal
active duty force draft, the draft to reserves, and the draft with discouragement of
volunteers are the most viable alternatives.
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In a recent study conducted on the draft, Morris and Arnold [Ref. 9] come to the
somewhat surprising conclusion that a return to conscription in the U. S. would
actually increase budget costs for military labor. For example, a draft with draftees
and other new service members receiving half the basic pay they currently receive
would cost S1.5 billion more than an AVF. Their results contradict studies done before
the end of the draft that consistently predicted that an AVF would cost more than a
draft.
The major assumption that Morris and Arnold make is to keep force
effectiveness constant. Previous AVF cost reports maintained a constant total strength
but allowed force effectiveness, or the quality of the force, to vary. This report
proposed to maintain the same level of effectiveness in the military by increasing
enlistments to keep the career force at the present size. The number of new service
members under the draft would have to increase because fewer members would elect to
make a career of the military.
Morris and Arnold point out that recent economic and social changes in the
19S0s have brought on renewed interest in a return to conscription. These include: (1)
strong popular support and political pressure to reduce the Federal budget deficit; (2)
an improving economy that is better able to provide satisfactory employment
opportunities to enlistment-age individuals; (3) a shrinking national manpower pool of
17- to 23-year-olds through the mid-1990s; and (4) rapid technological changes
mandating the accession and retention of sufficient numbers of individuals in critical
military skill areas. In addition to cost, the focus should also be on readiness and force
effectiveness.
The study developed a model termed the Enlisted Accession and Career Entry
Model that calculates service-specific accession requirements, reenlistment bonus
policies, and the subsequest personnel flows that would result if first-term pay was
reduced. The model predicts personnel flows for each service that satisfy two
objectives: (1) The first term force effectiveness under conscription equals the first term
force effectiveness currently under the AVF, and (2) The number of personnel entering
the career force is the same under all scenarios. Under varying assumptions, the model
predicts the number of draftees (ranging from 24,000 - 235,000), the number of draft
motivated volunteers, and the number of true volunteers.
The study considers a number of other factors which affect budget costs. Factors
that will increase budget costs when moving from an AVF to a draft include increased
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training requirements, increased reenlistment bonuses after the first term, additional
costs of operating the Selective Service System to support the draft, possible increases
in educational benefits, and a reduction in tax receipts. Factors that will decrease costs
include reduction in recruiting personnel required, reduction in advertising costs, and
an elimination of enlistment bonuses.
The study assumes two scenarios; (1) a 50 percent reduction in base pay for first
term enlisted and, (2) an 80 percent reduction in base pay for first term enlistees. In
both cases all other pays and allowances were held constant. Morris and Arnold
estimated that the 50 percent reduction would cost the government between S371
million and S2.5 billion more than the present system, with the most likely cost of SI.
5
billion. The 80 percent reduction would produce between a S924 million savings and
an additional cost of S2 billion. The estimates varied as a result of changing
assumptions about the supply elasticity and reenlistment bonus elasticity. A significant
result was that with a 50 percent reduction in base pay, the draft was always more
costly than an AVF.
The results predicted by the EACEM model appear to contradict those of the
Gates Commission and other DOD studies completed in the 1970s. As mentioned
earlier, these studies failed to hold force effectiveness constant. As a result, most
studies predicted a lower cost using conscription but this was at the expense of
degraded effectiveness. External factors such as unemployment, relative military and
civilian compensation, patriotism, and enlistment availability and eligibility will most
likely have a significant effect on the differential costs of conscription.
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The objective of this study is to estimate the social welfare loss of a hypothetical
draft in the United States during the 1980s. A mathematical model is used to estimate
losses which result from two factors: draft avoidance and random selection. The study
uses 1985 data for active enlisted service members only. Officers and members of the
reserves are not considered. The effect of varying assumptions on total welfare losses
is also calculated.
E. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The results of this study indicate that social welfare losses under conscription are
significant. The total losses resulting from draft avoidance and random selection vary
from SI billion to in excess of S5 billion depending on the assumptions made.
16
Additionally, when the costs of collection are compared to the conscription tax levied
on draftees and reluctant volunteers, it is clear that conscription is a very inefficient
means of taxation. In every case evaluated, the cost of collection exceeded the amount
of the conscription tax.
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II. MODEL
This chapter reviews the model of participation in the military and draft
avoidance under conscription. This model was originally developed by Sjaastad and
Hansen [Ref. 2] and applied by Cooper. [Ref. 5] The model estimates: (1) who serves
under the draft based on the characteristic of supply price, (2) the total amount spent
(social welfare loss) by those attempting to avoid induction, and (3) the excess
economic cost (also a social welfare loss) of conscription, based on who actually serves.
The data developed in the next chapter will be applied to this model to estimate the
social welfare loss of a hypothetical draft for the United States in the 1980s. While
other causes of social welfare losses (e.g. turnover, overutilization of labor) exist under
conscription, this model estimates losses which result only from draft avoidance
activities and from random selection.
A. SUPPLY PRICE OF LABOR
The economic cost of military' labor resources can be defined as the opportunity
cost for those individuals employed in the military. This definition can be interpreted
in either of two ways: (1) The opportunity cost to the civilian economy, or (2) the
opportunity cost to the individual serving in the military.
According to the first interpretation, if an individual is employed by the military,
he is no longer available to the private sector. The civilian economy suffers a loss
equal to the amount of productive output he could have achieved had he not been in
the military. This loss can be measured by the individual's civilian wage, assuming that
this wage represents the value of his output to the civilian economy.
The second interpretation is evaluated with respect to the individual. Not only
does an individual forgo his civilian wage while serving in the military but he also may
give up additional nonmonetary benefits (e.g. freedom to choose where he lives). This
interpretation of opportunity cost is more encompassing than the first interpretation.
It is represented by an individual's "supply price" or "reservation wage"--the wage that
an individual would have to be paid to join the military. Simply stated, some
individuals must be paid a premium for working in the military. On the other hand,
others may be willing to accept a smaller wage than they could have earned as a
civilian because of their positive perception of life in the military.
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Supply price, rather than alternative civilian wage, is the preferred measure of
economic cost for a variety of reasons. First of all, it represents the mechanism by
which labor resources are allocated in a free market. Second, supply price is a broader
definition in that it includes the nonpecuniary aspects of serving in the military.
B. MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC COST - RANDOM SELECTION
A standard labor supply model provides the framework to measure the economic
cost of conscription. The supply curve, SS', in Fig. 2.1 arrays individuals according to
their supply price. The military wage (first term compensation) is measured on the
vertical axis and the proportion of the total manpower pool which is required to serve
in the military is measured on the horizontal axis. For any given wage, the supply
curve shows the number of individuals who will voluntarily join the military.
The model is based on the assumption that the size of the required military labor
force (and required accessions) is determined beforehand by other factors. Cooper
[Ref. 7] argues that this may not be a valid assumption. He contends that the military
will tend to overuse labor because the military wage during conscription is set
artificially low. In this case military labor is cheap with respect to capital, so more
labor will be used. To the extent that this is true, the social welfare loss computed here
is underestimated.
In Fig. 2.1, the accession requirements are shown as the distance OB out of the
total eligible manpower pool. Since SS' represents the voluntary supply of^ military
labor, the military can attract OB true volunteers by paying a wage, Wl. The
economic cost of military labor in this case is the sum of individual supply prices for
those serving in the military or, alternatively, the area under the supply curve from to
B. Cooper states, [Ref. 5: p. 71]
Since the supplv curve represents the mechanism bv which labor resources are
allocated in a 'competitive market, this area is the appropriate measure of
economic cost which should be used to evaluate various methods of manpower
procurement. Moreover, this area represents the smallest possible economic cost
when OB labor resources are demanded by the military.
During a draft, the economic cost of military manpower is much more difficult to
quantify because of who actually serves. Under conscription, the government can
establish a military wage, WO, which is lower than the market wage needed to attract
the required number of volunteers. If the military wage under conscription is set at
19
Figure 2.1 Economic Cost of Manpower.
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WO, only OA volunteers will join the military. Therefore, the number of draftees and
draft-motivated volunteers must correspond to the distance. AB. The economic cost of
this manpower depends critically on who is selected.
To illustrate the point, Cooper [Ref. 5: pp. 72-73] examined two extreme cases.
The first case is very similar to the conscription policy that was used in 1917. The
draft was structured by the use of exemptions and other policies, to conscript the
lowest supply-priced individuals first. The individuals selected are those who are
arrayed on the Sb portion of the supply curve. The result is that the OB accession
requirement is filled with the same individuals who would volunteer if the wage was set
at Wl. The economic cost in this case is the same as the cost of a volunteer military
because the supply curve and the area below it are the same. This policy was criticized
as being socially repressive because it drafted first those who were less well off. Efforts
were subsequently made to establish a more random selection process.
A completely random draft selection process presents the other extreme case.
The lottery draft used during the latter stages of the Vietnam War exemplifies this case.
Because of the randomness of the selection process, some individuals on the bS'
portion of the supply curve in Fig. 2.1 are inducted. The result is that the ab portion
of the supply curve shifts toward ac. The opportunity costs of the higher supply-priced
individuals randomly selected from bS' are higher than those of people selected from
ab. The shift of the supply curve from ab to ac causes the economic cost, represented
by the area under the supply curve, to increase. Although the same number of
individuals are selected to serve, the composition of the group has changed.
The increase in the economic cost of this random selection policy, over a
volunteer policy, results in a social welfare loss. The magnitude of this loss
corresponds to the area abc. The private economy suffers a loss because some higher
supply-priced individuals are now required to serve in the military. The outcome of
this is that the more random the selection process, the further to the left the line ac will
shift, producing an even greater social welfare loss.
C. DRAFT AVOIDANCE COSTS
As mentioned earlier, the draft results in a tax being levied on those who are
required to serve in the military. This is the conscription tax discussed by Sjaastad and
Hansen [Ref. 2] and also by Oi. [Ref. 3] Whenever the government imposes a tax,
certain costs are incurred while collecting it. Included among these costs of collection
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are the costs incurred by those attempting to avoid payment. These costs represent
actual resources expended, and because they do not benefit society, they are social
welfare losses.
The amount of costs incurred by those attempting to avoid the tax are. in
general, a function of (1) the amount of the tax itself and (2) the difficulty of escaping
payment. In the first case, as the tax increases, one would expect more to be spent in
trying to avoid payment of it. The second case is not as straightforward. When it is
very difficult to avoid the tax, fewer will make an attempt to avoid it. Those who do,
however, can be expected to spend more in their attempt. It makes sense to incur tax
avoidance costs only when there is a reasonable chance to avoid the tax.
It is difficult to quantify the total amount spent on draft avoidance activities, but
economic theory provides a way to model the problem. The objective is to identify
who will engage in draft avoidance activities, and of those who do, to determine how
much they will spend. 1 The model that follows attempts to do these two things for
both a prelottery and a lottery type draft.
D. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
The following assumptions are made in this model:
Individuals attempt to maximize expected income,
Constant marginal utility of income,
Supply price to the military just equals civilian income foregone, 2 and
The probabilitv of being inducted is a declinine function of the cost incurred to
avoid induction.
Expected income, y, is equal to (1) the probability of not having to serve times
the amount they could earn in civilian employment less what they spend on avoiding
induction plus (2) the probability of having to serve times military pay less the amount
To gain a perspective on the number of people who actuallv engage in draft
avoidance activities, the following Vietnam era (August 1964 - March 19T3)Tieures are
provided. Out of the total draft eligible (ages 19"- 25 inclusive) pool of 26.800,000
men, 8,720,000 enlisted and 2,215.000 were drafted. 570.000 were classified as apparent
draft offenders (those who were eligible but were not deferred, exempted, or
disqualified) while 15,410,000 were deferred, exempted or disqualified. The most
commonlv used means of escaping induction were: (1) phvsical and mental exemptions
(4.935.000), (2) escape from the lottery (4.009.000), '(3) marriage or fatherhood
(2.420.000). (4J occupational deferments (483,000), and (5) student deferments
(317.000). fRef. 10: p. :>]
"As discussed earlier, this may or may not be a valid assumption based on how
the individual views the nonmonetary benefits of civilian life relative to the military.
Those on the upper reaches of the siipplv curve will likelv place a higher premium o'n
those benefits while those on the lower end of the curve may actually perceive that the
military' offers greater nonmonetary benefits relative to the civilian community.
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spent attempting to avoid induction.
y = (1 -pXw-c) + p(l -c) (eqn2.1)
where p = the probability of being inducted
c = the costs spent attempting to avoid induction, and
w = the individual's alternative civilian earnings opportunity
(where the military wage equals one).
By cancellation,
y = w - c - pw + p (eqn 2.2)
Expected income, y, is a function of the amount spent on trying to avoid the
draft, which is represented by c. Individuals attempt to maximize y by their choice of
c.
Those who make less than the military wage as civilians will not spend anything
on draft avoidance because they would not be maximizing expected income and would
be worse of for doing so. For those whose civilian wage exceeds the military wage
(which equals 1 in this case), the optimum amount for c can found by differentiating y
with respect to c and setting it equal to 0:
dyjdc = dp'dc (1 - w) - 1 (eqn 2.3)
dp.'dc = 1/(1 - w) (eqn 2.4)
The relationship between p and c determines how much a person will spend on
draft avoidance. A simple but realistic model is one in which the probability of being
inducted is a declining function of the amount spent on draft avoidance. Sjaastad and
Hansen [Ref. 2: p. IV-1-6] suggest a "plausible" relationship of
p(c) = 1 emc (eqn 2.5)
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where m is a variable subject to the control of the Selective Service System. Although
it is simple, this functional form seems realistic when one considers that if a person
spends nothing on draft avoidance, his probability of being drafted is 1. Conversely, if
he spends a large amount, the probability will decrease toward 0.
The Selective Service System determines how difficult it will be for an individual
to avoid the draft. By establishing draft selection policies, it determines the value of m
in Eq. 2.5. For example, when many forms of deferments are offered to potential
inductees, this increases the value of m and makes draft avoidance expenditures more
cost effective. When the selection process is made more random, as in a lottery, the
value of m decreases. In other words, a given amount spent on avoiding the draft will
decrease the probability of being inducted more with a large value of m than with a
smaller value.
Given Eq. 2.5,
<3p/<3c = -m'emc = -mp (eqn 2.6)
Substituting Eq. 2.6 and Eq. 2.3,
p = 1 m(w-l) (eqn 2.7)
becomes the marginal condition. Eq. 2.7 cannot be satisfied when w < (l+m),'m
because the probability would exceed 1. Sjaastad and Hansen offer the following
explanation, [Ref. 2: p. IV- 1-7]
The appropriate interpretation of cases where 2.7 implies p > 1 is that of a
corner solution; persons who cannot satisfv condition 2.7 are those for whom the
gains associated with reducing the probability of induction are so small that no
expenditure to do so is justified. These persons will simplv permit themselves to
become drafted, or they may even volunteer but they would not do so in the
absence of conscription. Persons able to satisfy 2.7 enter the militarv only as
draftees.
By setting p = 1, in Eq. 2.7,
w* = 1 + 1/m (eqn 2.8)
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represents the supply price below which individuals will spend nothing on draft
avoidance.
This is illustrated in Fig. 2.2. Individuals on the supply curve above w* will
expend resources to avoid the draft. Everyone on the supply curve below w* will, in
general, serve in the military. Some are true volunteers, some are draft-motivated
volunteers, and others are inductees. The probability that individuals lying above w*
on the supply curve will serve depends, among other things, on the amount spent
attempting to avoid the draft, and this depends on the individual's supply price.
Higher supply-priced individuals will spend more on draft avoidance because they have
more to gain by not being drafted. Because they spend more, their chance of being
inducted is smaller.
The amount that an individual (assuming he lies on the supply cure above w*)
will spend can be determined by equating Eqs. 2.5 and 2.7:
e
mc
= m(w- 1), forw > w* (eqn 2.9)
Taking logarithms of both sides of the equation,
c = (lnm + ln(w - l)},m, forw > w* (eqn 2.10)
If s* represents the proportion of the eligible manpower pool who have supply
prices below w*, then the total amount spent on draft avoidance by all individuals is:
.1
Total Cost = j c(w(s)}ds (eqn 2.11)
C{w(s)} is defined in Eq. 2.10 and w(s) is the supply of labor to the military.
I chose a constant elasticity supply function to describe the relationship between
wages, w, and the proportion of the population, s. [Ref. 2: p. IV- 1-29] Given one point
on the function (which is determined in the following chapter), and the assumption
about constant elasticity, the relationship can be expressed by the following:
The elasticitv of militarv labor supplv with respect to militarv pav is assumed to




A S* B 1
PROPORTION OF ELIGIBLE POOL
Figure 2.2 Draft Avoidance Costs.
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w(s) = ysv (eqn 2.12)
The value of y can be determined given a point on the function and the value of v is
dependent on the value of elasticity chosen (e.g. v = 1 when elasticity = 1.00).
Eq. 2.11 can be modified to account for different types of conscription. For
example, the costs of collection under a pre-lottery draft can be stated by the following:
Total Cost = Nf 1 m(lnm + ln(w(s)-l)}ds {eqn 2.13)
s*
where N equals the number of individuals in the eligible manpower pool.4
Eqs. 2.1 through 2.14 comprise the model developed by Sjaastad and Hansen to
predict who will serve in the military and how much will be spent on draft avoidance.
The model is illustrated in Fig. 2.2. The distance 0A corresponds to the number of
true volunteers that are willing to join at the current military wage (designated as 1 in
this case). Persons on the supply function between points a and b will not be willing
to incur costs to avoid being drafted, and will be inducted. Everyone above b on the
supply curve (s* to 1) will incur draft avoidance costs and will generally not be
inducted.
From Fig. 2.1 the economic cost of an all volunteer force (or a draft that
conscripted the lowest supply-priced individuals first) corresponds to the area below the
supply curve, SS', from to B. The total cost, exclusive of draft avoidance costs, can
be computed using the following equation,
E
v
= Jw(s)ds (eqn 2.14)
where w(s) = supply of military labor, and
B = proportion of the manpower pool required to serve.
N refers to the number of annual (eross) additions to the dooI of eligible
persons who meet all for the following criteriaTU) male, (2) 18 vears ofage in 198x. (3)
high school graduate, and (4) included in AFQT categories I -'III A. A more detailed
explanation of this is given in the following chapter.
27




= NL P( s )w(s)ds (eqn2.15)
where p(s) = 1, when w < (1 + l/m)w*
and p(s) = l,m(w - 1), when vv > (1 + l/m)w*
The economic cost of a lottery draft is calculated according to the equation,
E = N{[\v(s)ds + (B - A),(l - A)jw(s)ds} (eqn 2.16)
The excess economic costs due to random selection for each type of draft can be
calculated by subtracting the economic cost of an AVF (Eq. 2.14) from the respective
economic cost of each policy (Eq. 2.15 or Eq. 2.16).
The conscription tax - the tax imposed on those who either reluctantly volunteer
or are drafted - is defined as the sum of the differences between the supply prices and
the military wage for those affected. [Ref. 2: p. IV- 1-8] The tax is represented by the
area abc in Fig. 2.2. For those individuals on the supply curve above point b, the
expected conscription tax to be paid is equal to the amount of the tax times the
probability of paying it, or p(w - 1). From Eq. 2.7. the conscription tax is equal to p(w
- 1) = l,m(w - 1) X (w - 1) = 1/m. That is, across individuals the expected tax
remains constant. For individuals on the supply curve above b, as the amount of tax
increases, the probability of paying it decreases. This is consistent with the model in
that as the individual's supply price increases, it is to his advantage to incur cost
avoidance costs, and this decreases his probability of being drafted.
The conscription tax, T, is calculated for a pre-lottery draft as
T = Nj p(s) (w(s) - l)ds (eqn 2.17)
where p(s) = 1, for w < (1 + 1/m), and




In this chapter, specific data will be developed in the following areas: ( 1 ) military
wage, (2) supply elasticity of military labor, and (3) the total number of individuals
eligible to be inducted.
B. MILITARY WAGE
1. Regular Military Compensation
Military compensation currently consists of pays, allowances, and benefits
based on a member's pay grade, years-of-service, and special skills. Members are paid
bi-monthly as a salary. The military compensation system is usually broken down into
the following: (1) regular military compensation, (2) pays and allowances, and (3) other
compensation elements.
Regular military compensation is defined as the total of the following elements
that a member of a uniformed service receives every payday: basic pay, basic
allowance for quarters (including any variable housing allowance), basic allowance for
subsistence, and a federal tax advantage that accrues because these allowances are not
subject to a federal income tax. [Ref 11]
The computed military wage is based on 1985 pay and allowance rates for
enlisted service members in the U. S. Navy. Pay and allowance rates are essentially the
same for other services but annual amounts received may differ because of differences
in promotion rates. First term compensation, consisting of regular military
compensation for the first two years, will be computed.
a. Basic Pay
Basic pay is the primary compensation received by all military personnel.
Every member of the military is entitled to the continuous receipt of basic pay while on
active duty. Basic pay rates are determined by a service member's pay grade and
length of service.
This study assumes that enlisted service members are promoted according
to the schedule in Table 1. The times in pay grade listed are minimum times required.




TIME IN PAY GRADE REQUIREMENTS FOR ENLISTED
PROMOTION







Source: Department of the N avy BUPERS Instructic n 1430. 16B
Increases in basic pay automatically occur at promotion and at designated
longevity steps. Longevity step increases are designed to recognize additional
experience. Because the first longevity step occurs at the two year mark, it has no
effect on wages computed here.
Adjustments to the basic pay rate levels are set annually in the defense
appropriations process. In order to attract and retain required manpower, the military
sets the growth of pay rates at roughly the same rate as wages in the private sector.
Table 2 lists the enlisted basic pay rates for E-l through E-4.
TABLE 2
ENLISTED BASIC PAY TABLE FOR 1985
Paygrade
Time in Service E-l E-2 E-3 E-4
Under 4 months
Over 4 months
Less than 2 vears
Less than 2 years






Source: Navy Pay and Personnel Procedures Manual
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b. Basic Allowance For Quarters
When a service member is not provided adequate government housing, he
is eligible to receive a monthly cash allowance for quarters. This Basic Allowance for
Quarters (BAQ) payment amount varies by pay grade and also by whether the member
has dependents. When adequate government housing is available, the enlisted service
member does not receive a BAQ payment. Because there is a shortage of government
housing, and because we wish to quantify the housing benefit received, this study
assumes the member receives a BAQ payment. The combination of BAQ and VHA
payments is approximately equal to the value of comparable government housing in all
areas of the country. Therefore, the assumption does not bias the estmate of the
military wage in either direction. Table 3 lists the BAQ rates for E-l through E-4.
TABLE 3



















Source: Navy Pay and Personnel Procedures Manual
c. Variable Housing Allowance
In 1980 Congress enacted legislation implementing the Variable Housing
Allowance (VHA). It was designed to make additional compensation to service
members who lived in high cost areas such as Hawaii and California. VHA payment
amounts vary by geographic location. VHA is received only by members who are
eligible to receive BAQ. The combination of BAQ and VHA ideally provides the
member with enough funds to meet average housing costs in the local area.
A survey was made of 15 locations in the United States where enlisted
service members may be required to serve. The survey included areas where members
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from each of the services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) are stationed. It also
included the lowest cost area, Johnstown Pennsylvania, and the highest cost area,
Honolulu, Hawaii, in the United States. A simple average was computed for the 15
locations. No attempt was made to weight the average in relation to the number of
enlisted members stationed at a particular location. VHA rates also depend on
whether a member has dependents. Table 4 lists the computed means of the VHA
rates for the 15 locations surveyed. The locations surveyed and the rates for those
locations appear in Appendix B.
TABLE 4
AVERAGE 1985 ENLISTED VARIABLE HOUSING ALLOWANCE BY
PAYGRADE
PAYGRADE
E-l E-2 E-3 E-4
With Dependents 95.41 90.13
Without Dependents 53.33 55.08
86.75 93.51
62.71 63.82
Source: Joint Travel Regulations and Appendix B
d. Basic Allowance for Subsistence
Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) is a cash allowance intended to
cover some part of an enlisted member's subsistence costs. All active duty members
receive the allowance. The BAS amount is the same for all pay grades, S 156.30, except
for E-ls with less than four months of service, who receive S144.60.
e. Federal Income Tax Advantage
Military members accrue an income tax advantage because federal income
taxes are not paid on BAQ, VHA, and BAS. This tax advantage can represent a
significant percent of total compensation. The total benefit is equal to the amount of
taxes which would have been owed on this additional income (allowances) had they
been taxed at the member's normal tax rate.
A tax advantage or savings was computed for single and married enlisted
service members for each of the first two years of service. Using 1985 Internal
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Revenue Service tax tables, tax savings were calculated by computing the amount of
tax owed on gross income (including all allowances) minus personal exemptions (S1040
per individual and per qualified dependent). The same calculation was made on gross
income minus the BAQ, VHA, and BAS allowances. Because less tax is owed on the
smaller of the two incomes, the tax savings is the difference in the taxes owed on the
two amounts.
Table 5 shows the computed tax savings for single and married enlisted
members. The tax savings computation was made using the following assumptions: ( 1
)
a single enlisted member with no dependents, no outside income and no major tax
deductions, and (2) a married member with 2 children, no other income, and no major
tax deductions.
TABLE 5

























Source: Computed bv author using Form 1040
and 1985 IRS tax tables.
/ Total RMC
Regular Military Compensation is the sum of basic pay, allowances for
subsistence and quarters, and a federal tax advantage. Assuming a promotion schedule
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previously mentioned in this chapter, I computed an RVIC value for married and single
enlisted members. These figures appear in Table 6. The breakdown of RMC by
individual components appears in Appendix A.
TABLE 6
1985 REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION VALUES
Year Single Married
1 SI 2,708 14,427
2 14,512 15,626
Source: Appendix A
Marital status affects the amount of payment a service member receives for
BAQ and VHA. It also influences how much is paid in federal income taxes. Married
members receive a greater amount for these two allowances to cover additional living
expenses. Also, married members filing jointly will pay a lesser tax than a single
member for the same amount of taxable income.
In an attempt to compute one single RMC value, I weighted RMCs by the
percentage of members who were married and by the percentage of those who were
single. Data on marital status by paygrade was obtained for each of the four services.
Table 7 lists the percent married and percent single by paygrade. RMC by paygrade
was computed by using the following formula:
For each paygrade:
RMC = (% married) X (married RMC)
+ (% single) X (single RMC)
Table 8 shows the desired first term compensation estimate of S27,776.
2. Educational Benefits
During the 1900s, the government has provided financial assistance for
education to military' veterans under several different programs. Included among these
were the G.I. Bill, the Veteran's Educational Assistance Program (VEAP), the New
G.I. Bill, and the Army College Fund. Because the monetary value of the educational
benefits offered can be substantial, and also because similar benefits are not received by
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Source: D<>fense Manpower Data Center
TABLE 8


















Source: Computed by author
most civilian workers, the value of these benefits was considered in this study. If
significant, the monetary value of the benefits would be added to RMC to produce the
military wage.
a. Veteran's Educational Assistance Program
Enlisted service members who came on active duty between January 1,
1977 and June 30, 1985 are eligible to receive benefits under VEAP. Those entering
between July 1, 1985 and June 30, 1988 are eligible for the New G. I. Bill. VEAP was
used in this study to compute the value of educational benefits because it had been in
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effect for six months during 1985 and because data on enrollment and usage was
available.
VEAP was a voluntary program which required both the service member
and the government to contribute funds to be used for education. To qualify, one had
to be on active duty for at least 24 months. Under VEAP, service members
contributed as little as S25 or as much as S100 per month to a VEAP account. At the
end of 12 consecutive months of contribution, the member was considered to be
established in the program and the government contributed S2 for every SI saved by
the member.
Contributions were limited to S2,400 for a two year enlistment and S2,700
for a three or more year enlistment. Thus, the maximum total contribution from the
government was S5,400. Service members could decide to drop out of the program at
any time (disenroll) and their contributions were refunded by the Veterans
Administration. Because of this option, the number of members who have actually
received benefits under VEAP has been relatively low.
The objective here was to calculate an average monetary value of benefits
for an individual joining the military. The approach used was to determine: (1) how
many members were enrolling under VEAP, (2) how many members were disenrolling,
(3) how many veterans were receiving benefits, and (4) the monetary value of the
benefits received.
VEAP data for fiscal year 1986 are summarized in Appendix C. The data
reveal several somewhat surprising results: (1) over half of those established in the
program (542,561 of a total of 1,106,727) received disenrollment refunds during FY
1986, (2) the total number of people established decreased by almost 250,000 during
the year, (3) the number of people who actually received benefits during the year was
an extremely low percentage of the number established (2.84%), and (4) the total dollar
benefits paid during the year was less than 1% of gross contributions.
Based on the above results and because the military member receives no
benefits for at least two years after induction, this study concluded that the value of
educational benefits received under VEAP was an insignificant part of the military
wage. VEAP benefits paid were small because of the disenrollment option and because
of the low usage rate bv veterans.
36
3. Other Pays
Two additional general categories of pay exist in the military: special pay (e.g.
proficiency pay) and incentive pay (e.g. hazardous duty pay). [Ref. 11:: pp. 191-227]
Although some small percentage of the total number of enlisted service members with
less than two years of service may qualify for one or more of these pays, the majority
do not. One reason for this is the large amount of time spent by new members in a
training environment. Most have not gained the necessary skills to qualify for
additional pay.
4. Other Military Benefits
All military members receive the benefits listed in Table 9 as part of their total
military compensation. Although these benefits may be substantial, the monetary
value was not computed. Benefits received from civilian employment were assumed
generally to equal other military benefits.
TABLE 9
MILITARY BENEFITS
Air travel overseas for member and dependents
Annual Leave (30 days a year for all pay grades)
Burial Allowance
Commissary Stores (eroceries at cost plus 5%)
Death gratuitv (six tunes monthlv pavs)
Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (S622 to S726)
Disability Retired Pav
Disability Severance Pay
Government Contributions to Social Security
Low-Cost Vacation Resorts and Recreation Areas
Medical Care (members and dependents)
Military Exchange Privileges
Mortea'ge Insurance Premiums
Nondisability Retired and Retainer Pay
Nondisabilitv Severance Pav
Retired Members Medical Care
Survivor Benefit Plan
Unemployment Compensation
Source: Navy Milpers Manual 5030240, 4210160, 6230120,
4210260, 3855180, and 3860440
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C. SUPPLY ELASTICITY
The number of volunteers who join the military is a function of first-term military
compensation. The concept of elasticity of supply of military manpower attempts to
quantify this relationship. The interpretation of an elasticity value of 2.00. for
example, is that if first-term compensation increases by 10 percent, the number of
volunteers would increase by 20 percent.
An estimate of pay elasticity for military manpower supply is needed to compute
draft avoidance costs and excess costs due to random selection using the model
described in the previous chapter. Numerous studies predicting elasticity values have
been conducted using both cross-section and time series regression analyses. Goldberg
[Ref. 12: p. 10] averages the computed values of several studies conducted in the AVF
era (1970s).
TABLE 10
AVERAGES OF ELASTICITIES FROM AVF ERA STUDIES
































[Ref. 12: p. 10]
Table 10 presents a summary of his results; it indicates a wide dispersion between
elasticity values computed for each service. The values also vary considerably
according to the type of analysis used. Goldberg [Ref. 12: p. 9] points out that pay
elasticities from cross-section studies are substantially biased downward because poor
measures of civilian earnings were used. Instead of using civilian earnings for youth,
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researchers used average earnings for all production workers, and this measure resulted
in a biased estimate of elasticity.
In a study conducted on recruiting and enlistment supply, Dertouzos [Ref. 13: p.
19] estimates a supply elasticity of high-quality enlistments (AFQT categories I-IIIA)
with respect to civilian wages, to be -1.014. This means that as civilian wages go up
1%, high-quality enlistments will go down by 1.014%.
Based on the data presented in Table 10, and on Dertouzos' results, I determined
a supply elasticity of 1.00 to be the most representative value. I used this value in the
model. Sjaastad and Hansen used values of 1.00 and 1.25 in their study. [Ref. 2: p.
IV- 1-20]
D. ELIGIBLE POOL
An estimate of the total number of eligible inductees in the United States in 1985
was calculated based on a peacetime conscription policy. This figure was used with the
cost of collection model developed in the previous chapter to compute the related
social welfare loss. To be included in the pool, each person must have met all of the
following criteria: [Ref. 2: p. IV- 1-29]
• 18 years of age as of 1985
• High school graduate
• Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) categories I - II IA 5
• Male, non-prior service
Because the estimate is based on a policy of peacetime conscription, only 18 year
olds were considered as part of the eligible pool. Based on historical trends in the U.
S., this group contains a sufficient number of potential inductees to meet the military
accession requirements during peacetime. This implies that individuals are eligible to
be drafted for only one year. Once they turn 19, they are no longer eligible.
Sjaastad and Hansen [Ref. 2: p. IV-1-29] estimate that the bulk of the
conscription tax is paid by individuals who are both high school graduates and in
AFQT categories I-III. For this reason, only Cat. I - II IA high school graduates are
During the 1960s, all the Services emploved the AFQT to determine general
mental ability. In addition, each Service generally administered its own vocational
aptitude examinations, which were used for occupational assignment. In the early
1970s, the AFQT was dropped (except bv the Marine Corps), and each Service used its
own exam to classify individuals according to mental ability. Finallv, the Services have
recently returned to' a single examination cattery, ASVAB7Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Batten'), so thai better indicators of relative mental aptitude can be made
across the Services. [Ref. 5: p. 127} Four of the ten ASVAB subtests- Word
Knowledge. Paragraph Comprehension, Arithmetic Reasoning, and Numerical
Operations- are currently combined to produce the AFQT score. [Ref. 5: p. 12/]
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considered in computing social welfare losses. The estimates may be biased downward
(social welfare losses underestimated) because those who do not meet these criteria are
excluded from the analysis. Since these individuals are assumed to have low supply
prices, the effect is assumed to be minimal. The estimates of losses also may be biased
upward if the mix between Cat. I - IIIA HSGs and non-Cat. I - IIIA HSGs changes.
Specifically, if the military lowers its aptitude standards, and inducts more non-Cat. I
-IIIA HSGs, fewer Cat. I - IIIA HSGs will be required to serve and the estimates of
losses calculated in this study will be biased upward. I am assuming the mix remains
constant in this study. Although non-high school graduates and persons in category
IV have been inducted into the U. S. military', 6 the services prefer to induct high
school graduates in categories I - IIIA. [Ref. 14]
TABLE 11
ARMED FORCES QUALIFICATION TEST PERCENTILES















Table 11 provides a breakdown of AFQT categories by percentile.
Finally, although the number of females in the military has been increasing, in
this model only males were considered to be eligible for induction. The effect of
excluding females from the model biases the computed estimates upward. To the
extent that females have lower supply prices than males, the estimates of social welfare
losses associated with draft avoidance and with the selection process are overestimated.
First, many females would volunteer to serve at the draft wage, so fewer draftees would
The current minimum aptitude standards for enlistment of males in the U. S.
Naw, for example, are: (a) High school graduates - AFQT of 17 (category IVB); (b)
GED - AFQT of 31 (cateeorv nlBK and (c) Non-high school graduates - AFQT of 33
(cateeorv IIIB). Persons Below AFQT cateeorv IV are generally not permitted to enter
the armed forces.
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be needed. Second, many relatively low supply-priced females would be selected for
induction from the eligible pool. The excess economic cost associated with these
individuals would, therefore, be less.
Appendix D provides a breakdown of percentages of the population by education
level, sex, age, and AFQT category. The figures given are percentages of the total U.
S. population in 1980. They were obtained from data collected during the Profile of
American Youth study sponsored by the Department of Defense and conducted by the
National Opinion Research Center (NORC). The study sampled approximately 12,000
American youth from ages 16 to 23. From the appendix, the percentage of 18 and 19
year old, male, high school graduates in mental categories I -IIIA was 25.3%.
Although small differences may exist in the percentages between age groups, they were
assumed to be the same. In other words. 25.3% of all 18 year olds were assumed to
have met the criteria, along with 25.3% of all 19 year olds.
TABLE 12
TOTAL U. S. MALE POPULATION BY AGE AS OF APRIL 1980














Source: U. S. Bureau of Census, Current Population Reports
One final assumption made was that the percentage of the population that met
the required criteria remained constant between 1980 and 1985. Therefore, since 25.3%
of the population met the criteria in 1980, the same percentage represented the eligible
pool in 1985.
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Using the 13 year old population of males in 1980 from Table 12 (1,866.000) as a
representation of the 18 year old population in 1985, 7 and applying the 25.3% figure
from Appendix D, the total eligible pool in 1985 was 472.000. This was the figure used
in the draft avoidance cost model to estimate social welfare losses.
Available statistics indicate that approximately one half of one percent of all
males in the U. S. fail to survive from age 13 to age' 18. Therefore, the efiect of this




Using the Sjaastad and Hansen model developed in Chapter II and the data from
the previous chapter, I calculated several estimates of social welfare losses resulting
from random selection and from draft avoidance, as well as an estimate of the
conscription tax. The analysis was limited to the losses which result from an effective
peacetime force equal in size to that which existed in the United States in 1985
(approximately 1.8 million). The estimates obtained refer only to first-term enlisted
male service members. Non-career officers were not considered.
B. MODEL VARIABLES
Estimates were calculated using a number of different scenarios. The variables
used in the model and the particular values of those variables are described in the
following paragraphs. The model provides a method for computing random selection
and draft avoidance costs for both a pre-lottery and lottery draft.
1. Elasticity of Supply Function
I selected a constant elasticity supply function to use with the model. As
discussed in the previous chapter, the most representative value of elasticity was
determined to be 1.00. This value was used in the model. Sjaastad and Hansen
determined that a greater value of elasticity of supply will decrease the estimates for
avoidance costs and for the conscription tax. [Ref. 2:: p. IV- 1-33]
2. Number of Accessions
Two assumptions were made regarding the number of accessions that the
military required to maintain a given force size. I initially assumed that the required
number of accessions ofAFQT Categories I - IIIA high school graduates under a draft
equalled the number of accessions of AFQT Categories I - IIIA high school graduates
under an AVF-- 139,000. Although the age range of Cat. I -IIIA HSG accessions in
1985 was 17 to 38 years old, I am assuming that all inductees will be 18 years old
under a draft. The reason: because the military will most likely set the first term
military draft wage at a lower level than the AVF wage, fewer older high quality
recruits will be attracted and more 18 year old volunteers will be accessed. I am also
assuming that the military allows all willing Cat. I - IIIA HSGs to enlist. Secondly. I
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assumed that required accessions under a draft would be in the same proportion to the
number required for an AVF as those computed by Sjaastad and Hansen for the 1964
draft (about 1.24 : 1). [Ref. 2: p. IV- 1-24] In other words, more accessions would be
required under a draft than under an AVF. The primary reason for the increase in
accessions under a draft is that the average length of service of draftees tends to be
shorter than other enlistees. This leads to higher turnover and, hence, more required
accessions. The second value was computed to be 171,600.
3. Draft vs. AVF Wage
Under conscription, the use of coercion allows the government to set a
military wage that is lower than the wage under an all-volunteer system. For example,
during the most recent transition from conscription to an AVF in the U. S.
(1970-1971), Regular Military Compensation for first term enlisted service members
increased by over 51 percent— from S3,509 to S5,313. [Ref. 5] For this reason, and also
because I wanted to see what effect the variation in draft wage had on the estimates of
social welfare losses, I used two scenarios. Given the AVF wage, I assumed the draft
wage to be 80% of the AVF wage in the first case, and 50% of the AVF wage in the
second. VI orris and Arnold [Ref. 9] assumed similar scenarios of 50% and 80%
reductions in basic pay in their recent study on the comparison of budget costs
between conscription and an all-volunteer system.
4. Value of m
The particular assumptions made in each case determine the value of m. A
sample calculation of the value of m is illustrated at the end of this chapter.
For the purposes of estimating excess costs for a lottery draft, the model
assumes that everyone who has a supply price greater than w* stands an equal chance
of serving. This, however, does not substantially bias the results. [Ref. 5: p. 100] This
assumption implies a zero value of m because no matter how much one spends on
draft avoidance, he still has the same chance of being inducted. No expenditure on
draft avoidance will decrease his probability of serving. The value of m will never
reach zero in actual practice because there will always be ways in which one can avoid
induction (e.g. disabling oneself, leaving the country, or serving a prison sentence).
Theoretically for a true lottery, avoidance costs will be zero because the value
of m is zero. In actual practice, there will always be some individuals who will incur
costs to avoid the draft; either legally or illegally. Instead of using the model, I looked
at what took place with the lottery draft used during the latter part of the Vietnam
War, and tried to evaluate draft avoidance costs directly.
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5. Military Wage
From the previous chapter, the computed first term military wage was
rounded to S27,800.
C. ESTIMATES OF SOCIAL WELFARE LOSSES AND CONSCRIPTION TAX
The computed estimates of social welfare losses resulting from random selection
(Excess Cost) and draft avoidance (Collection), along with estimates of the




The following assumptions pertain to the tables:
• Required Accessions = 139,000
• Required Accessions = 171,600
• Draft wage = 80% AVF wage
• Draft wage = 50% AVF wage
I computed the value of m in each case given the mathematical relationships of
the model and given the assumptions about required accessions and the relationship
between the draft wage and the AVF wage.
TABLE 13
EXCESS ECONOMIC COST AND COSTS OF COLLECTION: 1985
(S billions - 1985)
PRE-LOTTERY
ASSUMPTIONS EXCESS COST COLLECTION TOTAL
a, c, m = 21
a, d, m = 4.2
b. c, m = 7.8









Source: Computed by author
The results in Table 13 indicate that decreasing the draft wage has the obvious
effect of increasing collection costs. With a lower draft wage, more individuals have an
incentive to engage in draft avoidance. Also, lowering the draft wage increases the
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excess economic cost of the draft. A greater proportion of high supply-priced
individuals are being inducted and this increases the excess economic cost of the draft.
TABLE 14
EXCESS ECONOMIC COST: 1985











Source: Computed by author
Table 14 shows the estimates of excess costs under a lottery system. As in the
pre-lottery case, the excess cost estimate increases when the draft wage is lowered.
Also, as the proportion of the population that is required to serve goes up, the excess
cost estimate rises. Once again, higher supply-priced individuals are replacing lower
supply-priced individuals.
The lottery draft used in the latter part of the Vietnam War reduced draft
avoidance costs (compared to the pre-lottery draft) for 3 reasons; (1) The lottery
allowed individuals to better understand their probability of being drafted- those with
high lottery numbers did not have to incur draft avoidance costs, (2) Individuals were
eligible to be drafted only for one year instead of for several years, and (3) The lottery
drafted younger people who, on the average had lower supply prices. [Ref. 7: p. 19.] In
spite of these reasons, draft avoidance under the lottery was still present. Although no
statistics were found that separated lottery and pre-lottery avoidance activities, a few
examples are given of the numbers of men who engaged in draft avoidance activities
during the Vietnam War. Of the 26.8 million men who were draft eligible (18 to 26
years old) during the Vietnam War (1964-1973), 16 million men escaped the draft.
Four million received high lottery numbers and were not required to serve. According
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to a Notre Dame survey, three-quarters of those who never served admitted that they
tried to avoid the draft. For example, the survey found that over one million men
manipulated their health in some way to avoid the draft. Also, over 171,000 applied
for Conscientious Objector status and 570,000 were classified as apparent draft
offenders. Most of these draft offenders fled the U. S. to avoid induction. [Ref. 10]
Millions of American men spent substantial sums of money or elected not to pursue
careers that they normally would have had the draft not been present.
TABLE 15
CONSCRIPTION TAX AND THE COSTS OF COLLECTION: 1985
(S billions - 1985)













Source: Computed by author
The results in Table 15 indicate that conscription is a very inefficient means of
taxation. In every case, the cost of collecting the tax exceeds the amount of the tax
itself. In other words, for every dollar of tax collected, it costs more than a dollar to
collect it-- an inefficient system of taxation by any measure.
Also from the table, as the draft wage is lowered, the conscription tax paid by
reluctant volunteers and by inductees increases significantly. The greater the decrease
in the draft wage, the greater will be the proportion of the population who have supply
prices greater than the draft wage. Since more people are paying the tax, the total tax
increases.
D. SAMPLE COMPUTATION
The following is an illustration of the calculations of draft avoidance costs
(Collection Costs) and the loss that results when individuals are selected without regard
for supply price (Excess Costs). I will use the model developed in Chapter II and
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assume the same conditions as those in the first case in Table 13 of this chapter. The
assumptions are:
Pre-lottery draft
Constant elasticity supply function
Supply elasticity = 1.00
Required accessions = 139,000
Draft wage = 80% of AVF wage
The constant elasticity supply function takes the form:
\v(s) = ysv
Since we assume a supply elasticity of 1.00, v takes on the value of 1. If, for
example, a supply elasticity of 1.25 was chosen, v would take on the value of 0.8.
Given the supply function and one specific point which lies on the function, other
points on the function can be found.
As a starting point, the model assumes that the military wage is equal to 1.
Using our assumption about the relationship between the draft wage and the AVF
wage, we have:
W(Draft) = 1 = (0.8) (W(AVF))
or, W(AVF) = 1.25
Since we know the AVF wage (S27,800) and we assume required accessions in
this case are 139,000 (s = Required accessions, Eligible pool = 139,000/472,000 =
.294), we now know one point on the function.
W(AVF) = 1.25 = ys 1
or, 1.25 = y(.294)
y = 4.24
The supply function, therefore, is
w(s) = 4.24s
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Given the assumptions about required accessions and the relationship between





ds + 11 I l/(m(4.24s - 1)) ds = .294
s* +l/mf l/(4.24s - 1) ds = .294
s*
w* = 4.24s*, w* = 1 + I/m, so s* = (1 + l/m)/4.24
1
(1 + l/m)/4.24 + (l/4.24m)(| ln(4.24s - 1)) = .294
(1 + 1/m); 4. 24
1/4.24(1 + 1/m + l,'m(ln3.24- ln(4.24(l 4- l/m);4.24 - 1)) = .294
1/4.24(1 + l/m(1.176- ln(l'm)) = .294
1 + I'm + 1 :m( 1.176- ln( 1 m)) = 4.24(.294)
1/m (2.176- ln(l'm)) = .247
m = 21 satisfies this equation.
To solve for s*,
w* = 1 + 1/m = 1 + 1/21 = 1.048, s* = 1.048/4.24 = .247
1. Collection Costs
For a pre-lottery draft, the costs of collection, C, were estimated as
-* m(ln(m) + ln(w(s) - l))ds
f
l
C = N(1/21)J(3.045 + ln(w(s)- l))ds
C = N(.048) (I 3.045s + |(4.24s +(-l))/4.24 (ln(4.24s - 1)) - s
C = N(.119)
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The eligible pool, N is 472,000; the AVF wage is S27,800, 8 so the draft wage is
S27.800 1.25 or S22.240.
C = (472,000)(22,240)(.119) = SI. 25 billion
2. Excess Costs
The excess economic cost of a pre-lottery draft is calculated by subtracting the








E = 10.50 billion f4.24s ds
V J A
->94




The economic cost of a pre-lottery draft is caluculated as follows:
'pd
: N f p(s)\v(s) ds
where p(s) = 1, for s = to s*,





= N(f4.24sds + l,'2lfl;(4.24s-l)4.24sds
.247 ,
.247
10.50 billion ( 12.12s
2 + l/6(js/4.24s+ l/4.24s2ln4.24s-l)
= S2.228 billion
E . - E = S0.30 billion.pd v
8
I decided not to discount the estimate of the military wage because my objective
was to compute the steadv state cost of the draft at a particular point in time, and not
to compute the cost of the draft to the individual. This is also the approach used by
Sjaastaa and Hansen. [Ref. 2]
50
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The model used in this study is a very simplified representation of what occurs
under conscription. It does, however, provide a rough estimate and indicates the
potential magnitude of the losses that result when a draft is used to procure military
manpower. The model also shows the relationships between the economic costs of
conscription and various input variables.
A principal conclusion of this study is that the social welfare losses associated
with draft avoidance and the selection of individuals without regard to supply price
were large under both a pre-lottery and lottery draft. The estimates provide some
measure of the economic costs of conscription that are not reflected in actual budget
expenditures. I did not consider the additional social welfare losses that would occur
because of overutilization of labor resources and increased turnover caused by
conscription. To the extent that these losses are present, the social welfare losses
computed in this study are underestimated.
Changing the assumption about what the military wage will be under
conscription has a significant effect on both types of welfare losses. The assumption
about required accessions affects the magnitude of both types of losses, but to a lesser
degree.
Two final points. The results of the study indicate that conscription is a very
inefficient taxation device. The costs of collection exceed the conscription tax in most
cases. Also, the estimates for total welfare losses are less for a lottery draft than for a
pre-lottery draft primarily because avoidance costs are smaller.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
I assumed an overly simplified constant elasticity supply function (elasticity =
1.00) to use with the model. This function seems unlikely to accurately describe the
military labor market over its entire range. Different supply functions, which perhaps
more closely resemble the actual market, should be applied to the model. Also, the
effect of changing the constant elasticity value should be investigated.
When alternative manpower procurement methods are evaluated, the evaluation
should include the consideration of the economic costs and of the social welfare losses
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caused by conscription. Any movement away from the current AVF policy should





Using the times in paygrade listed in Table 1, RMC values were computed by
paygrade for enlisted service members with and without dependents. This was done for

















































E-l (6 months) E- 2 (6 month;






Tax Benefit 368 368
TOTAL S 6,885 S 7,541
E-3 (9 months) E-4 (3_months)






Tax Benefit 578 193
TOTAL S 11,557 S 4,069
Source: Navy Pay and Personnel Procedures Manual, Author
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APPENDIX B
SURVEY OF VARIABLE HOUSING ALLOWANCE RATES
TABLE 18
SURVEY OF VARIABLE HOUSING ALLOWANCE RATES
(PER MONTH)
LOCATION PAYGRADE
























































































































































































Source: Joint Trav si Regulations
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APPENDIX C
VETERAN'S EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
TABLE 19
VEAP STATUS REPORT AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1986
(Totals for Fiscal Year 1986)
Active Participants (contributing) 294.907
Inactive (not contributing) 269,259
Disenrollment Refunds 542.561
Total Established 1,106.727




No. Received Training 63.221






PERCENTAGE OF 1980 U.S. POPULATION BY AFQT CAT. AND BY
SEX
Non-Hish School Graduate































Source: Defense Manpower Data Center
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TABLE 21




































Source: Defense Manpower Data Center
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TABLE 22
PERCENTAGE OF 1980 U.S. POPULATION BY AFQT CAT. AND BY
SEX
High School Graduates
Age 18 & 19
AFQT CAT MALE FEMALE TOTA
I 3.3% 4.2% 3.7%
II 15.7% 15.0% 15.3%
IIIA 6.3% 8.6% 7.5%
1 1 IB 7.1% 11.1% 9.0%
IVA 2.6% 4.8% 3.7%
IVB 2.0% 1.8% 1.9%
IVC 1.5% 1.3% 1.4%
V 1.2% 1.3% 1.2%
TOTAL 39.5% 48.1% 43.7%
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center
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APPENDIX E
FISCAL YEAR 1985 ACCESSIONS
TABLE 23
FY 85 DOD ACCESSIONS WITH HSD AND CAT I • IIIA BY AGE
AGE FREQUENCY CUM FREQ PERCENT CUM PERCENT
17 8128 8128 5.844 5.844
18 49522 57650 35.605 41.448
19 27169 84819 19.534 60.982
20 16884 101703 12.139 73.121
21 10954 112657 7.876 80.996
22 7863 120520 5.653 86.650
23 5685 126205 4.087 90.737
24 4023 130228 2.892 93.629
25 2719 132947 1.955 95.584
26 1943 134890 1.397 96.981
27 1276 136166 0.917 97.898
28 869 137035 0.625 98.523
29 593 137628 0.426 98.950
30 475 138103 0.342 99.291
31 348 138451 0.250 99.541
32 227 13S678 0.163 99.705
33 219 138S97 0.157 99.862
34 152 139049 0.109 99.971
35 39 139088 0.028 99.999
38 1 139089 0.001 100.000
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center
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